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Abstract
This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate in-
vestment under adverse selection. Its main ﬁnding is that such a relationship need not be
monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which
investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepre-
neurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in
entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high
and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discon-
tinuous fall in investment.
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Consider an economy in which entrepreneurs need to borrow funds in order to take advantage
of investment opportunities. In most cases, such borrowing is characterized by some degree of
asymmetric information. The lender, for example, might not be able to fully assess important
characteristics of the borrower. Or the borrower’s actions might not be fully observable. In these
situations, if he is to break even, the lender will need to design contracts that provide proper
incentives for the borrower. In most existing models, incentives are in part provided by limiting
the amount of lending in accordance with the borrower’s net worth. The prevailing view that
emerges from these models is that, whenever they are constrained because of informational frictions,
investment and credit must be increasing in entrepreneurial wealth.
This paper shows that the prevailing view does not necessarily apply to environments of adverse
selection. To this end, I develop a simple model of credit markets with adverse selection and fully
characterize the relationship between aggregate investment and entrepreneurial wealth. It is shown
that, even when aggregate investment is constrained due to the presence of adverse selection, it
need not be monotonically increasing in entrepreneurial wealth.
In my environment, entrepreneurs need to borrow funds in order to ﬁnance their investment
opportunities, on which they possess private information. Financial intermediaries seek to mitigate
the asymmetry of information by oﬀering a menu of contracts. More speciﬁcally, they try to screen
entrepreneurs through the amounts of collateral that they provide and of investment that they
undertake. Depending on the level of entrepreneurial wealth, it is shown that the credit market
equilibrium may either entail pooling, so that all entrepreneurs borrow indistinctly at the same
terms, or separation, so that diﬀerent entrepreneurs borrow at diﬀerent rates of collateralization,
pay diﬀerent rates of interest, and undertake diﬀerent levels of investment. I show that the pooling
equilibrium, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, is more likely to arise
when the latter is low relative to the desired level of investment. The separating equilibrium, in
which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, is most likely to arise when the latter is
high in relation to the desired level of investment. Moreover, I also show that for a given interest
rate, increases in entrepreneurial wealth may lead to a contraction in aggregate investment by
inducing the economy to switch from a pooling to a separating equilibrium.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. When entrepreneurial wealth is low relative
to the desired level of investment, screening is relatively costly in my economy. Indeed, since
collateral is scarce in this case, screening must be predominantly done by restricting the amount
of investment undertaken by the “good” entrepreneurs. Hence, there is a strong tendency to pool
1all projects and have good entrepreneurs cross-subsidize their bad counterparts. Whereas cross-
subsidization implies that the pooling equilibrium is costly for good entrepreneurs, it also beneﬁts
them by allowing them to expand their investment. In such a pooling equilibrium, investment is
independent of entrepreneurial wealth because the marginal unit borrowed by good entrepreneurs is
always fully cross-subsidized: hence, at the margin, the cost of borrowing is constant for them. As
entrepreneurial wealth increases, though, the screening possibilities of intermediaries are enhanced.
In particular, since screening can be increasingly done through collateralization requirements, its
cost decreases. Consequently, intermediaries can eventually design proﬁtable contracts tailored
to attract the most productive entrepreneurs from the pool by asking them to provide greater
quantities of collateral. The resulting equilibrium thus entails separation between diﬀerent types
of entrepreneurs.
As the previous analysis suggests, then, increases in entrepreneurial wealth might induce a
switch from a pooling to a separating equilibrium in the credit market. What happens to aggregate
investment when there is such a switch in regime? I show that, provided that the average quality of
investment in the economy is above a certain threshold, a switch of regime will lead to a fall in the
investment undertaken by all entrepreneurs. This must clearly the case for bad entrepreneurs, who
are cross-subsidized in the pooling equilibrium and therefore overinvest relative to their eﬃcient
level of investment. As for good entrepreneurs, the fall in their investment can be best understood
by noting that —at the switching point— they are by deﬁnition indiﬀerent between the pooling
and the separating contracts: the latter, though, entails a lower cost of funds because it does not
require cross-subsidization. Good entrepreneurs can therefore only be indiﬀerent between both
contracts if the pooling entails a relatively higher level of investment. In this manner, increases in
entrepreneurial wealth that induce regime switching in the credit market equilibrium will lead to a
fall in aggregate investment.
This paper adopts a static approach and seeks to characterize the relationship between en-
trepreneurial wealth and investment in the presence of adverse selection. The ﬁnding that this
relationship may be non-monotonic, though, has clear dynamic implications. In a companion pa-
per, I explore these implications and show how, in a dynamic setting, the type of adverse selection
studied here may generate ﬂuctuations even in the absence of exogenous perturbations.1
My environment is related to the work by Bester ([2], [3]), De Meza and Webb [6], and Besanko
and Thakor [1]. Bester analyzed the role of collateral for screening in environments of adverse
selection with indivisibilities in investment. In De Meza and Webb and Besanko and Thakor,
adverse selection leads to overinvestment. Between the two, the environment studied by Besanko
1See Martin [11].
2and Thakor is closest to mine, with two important diﬀerences. The ﬁrst is that, under their
assumptions, good entrepreneurs are screened by being forced to overinvest relative to the eﬃcient
level of investment: as the wealth of entrepreneurs increases, then, their investment decreases
towards the eﬃcient amount. In this sense, their model also generates a decrease in investment
in response to an increase in entrepreneurial wealth. In my model, though, this happens even
though good entrepreneurs are constrained relative to their eﬃcient level of investment. A second
important distinction between my model and that of Besanko and Thakor refers to the existence
of a pooling equilibrium. As is well known, screening environments à la Rothschild-Stiglitz [14]
pose a problem for the existence of equilibrium whenever the pooling allocation Pareto dominates
its separating counterparts. Whereas Besanko and Thakor deal with this problem by using the
concept of reactionary equilibrium, I am able to focus on sequential Nash equilibria. I do so by
following Hellwig [9] in modeling competition in the credit market as a three-stage game. Hellwig’s
speciﬁcation always has an equilibrium: in particular, among the feasible allocations that satisfy
the zero-proﬁt condition for banks, the one that yields the highest proﬁts to good entrepreneurs
—be it pooling or separating— emerges as the competitive equilibrium of my economy.2
In Section 2, I present the basic feature of the environments. Section 3 contains a complete
characterization of separating and pooling equilibria. Section 4 characterizes regime switches and
discusses their impact on aggregate investment. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Environment
Assume an economy that lasts for two periods, indexed by t ∈ {0,1}, that I refer to as Today and
Tomorrow. This economy is populated by a continuum of savers and entrepreneurs. Savers play
no role in this model besides being providers of funds: in this sense, they are assumed to have a
vast endowment of the economy’s only consumption good Today, which they are willing to lend
inelastically at the ﬁxed gross interest factor equal to (1 + r).
Entrepreneurs are central to my story. They are risk-neutral and have monotonic preferences
over the economy’s only consumption good Tomorrow, although their only endowment is in terms
of the consumption good Today. More importantly, they are endowed with a decreasing returns
to scale technology for transforming consumption goods Today into consumption goods Tomorrow.
The fact that this technology can be operated solely by them, though, means that it is potentially
subject to informational frictions. Assumptions on technology are as follows:
2In a related context, Dell’Aricia and Marquez [5] use this equilibrium concept to analyze how competition among
banks is aﬀected by the degree of private information that they have on the creditworthiness of borrowers.
3Assumption 1 (Technology). Entrepreneurs, which are uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1],
may be either of type B (“Bad”) or G (“Good”) depending on their technology. Entrepreneurs
of each type are distributed over intervals of length λj, j ∈ {B,G}, where λG + λB = 1. An
entrepreneur of type j has a successful (unsuccessful) state tomorrow with probability pj (1 − pj),
where pG > pB. If successful (unsuccessful), an entrepreneur of type j who invests I units of the
consumption good Today obtains a gross return of αjf(I) (zero) Tomorrow, where αG < αB and
pGαG > pBαB. It is assumed that f( ) is increasing, concave, and satisﬁes Inada conditions.
These technological assumptions are similar to those commonly used in the credit rationing
literature, namely second-order stochastic dominance. The only diﬀerence is that, in my setup, the
bad technology is not just a mean-preserving spread of its good counterpart but it actually has a
lower expected return. This latter assumption allows technologies to be unambiguously ranked.
Entrepreneurs are endowed with an amount W of the consumption good Today, which they
cannot use to ﬁnance their production.3 In order to do so they need to borrow funds, which they
do indirectly through banks. There exists a ﬁnite number of banks that collect deposits from savers
and from entrepreneurs and oﬀer loan contracts to entrepreneurs. Banks are assumed to be risk
neutral and competitive. On the deposit side, they take the gross interest factor on deposits (1 + r)
as given, and they Nash compete on the loan market by designing contracts that take the following
form:
Assumption 2 (Loan Contracts). Entrepreneurs and banks sign a contract of the form (I,R,c),
where I is the amount borrowed and invested, R is the interest factor on the loan and c is the
percentage of the loan that entrepreneurs must collateralize by using their own wealth. In the event
of a successful state, entrepreneurs pay back the amount borrowed adjusted by the interest factor:
otherwise, they default and the bank keeps the goods put up as collateral, the interest borne by
them, and the residual value of the project. Finally, and since they cannot invest it directly in the
project, entrepreneurs deposit their endowment in the bank for a gross interest factor of (1 + r).
This implies that the expected proﬁt that a j-type entrepreneur obtains from loan contract (I,R,c)
is given by
πj(I,R,c) = pj[αjf(I) − RI] − (1 + r)
 
(1 − pj)cI − W
 
. (1)
There are two features of the contracts described in Assumption 2 that I wish to highlight.
The ﬁrst is that these contracts are multidimensional in their instruments. Indeed, it will be
3This assumption is introduced to simplify the exposition, but it is not restrictive. The contracts that I study,
which entail collateral, could be rewritten as contracts in which entrepreneurs invest in their projects and banks
provide additional funds. I adopt the former characterization because it makes contracts easier to analize, it delivers
a more tractable framework, and it encompasses the cases in which entrepreneurial wealth can or cannot be directly
invested.
4shown that both the loan size and the rate of collateralization are used to screen between good
and bad entrepreneurs.4 A second consideration is that, in principle, the rate of collateralization
could either be positive or negative in this environment. Negative rates of collateralization, though,
which allow for payments from banks to entrepreneurs in the event of failure, are not useful for
screening purposes. On the contrary, they make contracts seem relatively more appealing to bad
entrepreneurs, who have a higher probability of failure and are therefore more likely to collect any
negative collateral. I therefore restrict myself, without loss of generality, to contracts in which
c ≥ 0.
I follow the adverse selection literature in making two assumptions regarding bank competition.
The ﬁrst is a condition of no cross-subsidization, by which banks are not allowed to oﬀer contracts
that lose money in expectation. The second assumption that is that of exclusivity, by which
entrepreneurs can apply to at most one of the contracts oﬀered. This assumption implies that
entrepreneurs borrow only from one bank, implicitly assuming that banks can monitor contract
applications made by entrepreneurs. It is also assumed that each bank gets the same share of
total deposits and, if they design the same contract, they get the same share and composition of
loan applications. Given Assumption 2, a bank’s expected proﬁt of accepting an application to a
contract (I,R,c) from a typej entrepreneur are given by
pj(RI) + (1 − pj)(1 + r)cI − (1 + r)I. (2)
3 Characterization of Loan Contracts







)} denote the equilibrium contracts under full information, it is




pj   Rj∗
+ (1 − pj)(1 + r)cj∗




for j ∈ {G,B}.
Hence, under full information, good entrepreneurs invest more than bad ones and banks break even
in both contracts. Investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth W: if entrepreneurs have
no wealth, they simply repay everything in the event of success by setting Rj∗
= (1 + r)/pj for
4The remaining dimension of the contract (R) will be pinned down in equilibrium by the zero-proﬁt condition of
banks.
5j ∈ {G,B}.5
Now consider the case of asymmetric information, in which banks are not able to distinguish
among diﬀerent types of borrowers. As in Besanko and Thakor [1] and Reichlin and Siconolﬁ [12],
it is assumed that borrowers’ types cannot be observed either directly or through realized project
returns. Hence, all agents other than the owner of the project can only verify whether the latter
was successful or not. In such a scenario it is known that the optimal contractual form is that of
debt as assumed in Assumption 2.6
Under asymmetric information, the environment studied is analogous to the Rothschild-Stiglitz
model of insurance. In the latter, an equilibrium does not always exist: in particular, it fails to
do so when the pooling allocation is Pareto superior to the separating allocation. To avoid this
problem, I follow Hellwig [9] and model competition in the credit market as having three stages. In
the ﬁrst stage, banks design contracts; in the second stage, entrepreneurs apply for these contracts
and; in the third stage, banks decide whether to accept or reject these applications.
Hellwig applies the concept of sequential equilibrium to this game and shows that an equilibrium
always exists: in particular, the speciﬁcation allows for the existence of pooling equilibria when
the values of the parameters prevent the existence of separating equilibria in Rothschild-Stiglitz
games.7 More interestingly, an application of the Kohlberg-Mertens stability criterion selects only
the allocation most preferred by good entrepreneurs as an equilibrium of the model. In other words,
the most robust outcome of the aforementioned game form will be the separating contracts insofar
as the latter provide good entrepreneurs with higher proﬁts than any pooling contracts. On the
contrary, if there are pooling contracts that are Pareto superior to the separating contract, the one
mostly preferred by good entrepreneurs will emerge as the most robust equilibrium of the model.8
In what follows, I analyze the equilibrium contracts for an economy indexed by a net interest
rate-entrepreneurial wealth pair (r,W). I ﬁrst characterize the separating equilibrium: as will be
seen, the interesting feature of these contracts is that the size of loans and the rate of collateral-
ization are both used as screening devices. When there is no wealth to be used as collateral, the
5To be precise, the economy under full information displays many equilibria. Indeed, banks are indiﬀerent between
making entrepreneurs pay only in the event of success (i.e., setting c
j = 0) and making them pay partially in the
event of success and partially in the event of failure (i.e., setting c
j > 0). All of these equilibria entail the same level
of investment and are equivalent in terms of eﬃciency.
6In a more general environment, Boyd and Smith [4] show that debt can arise as the optimal contractual form
under adverse selection and costly state veriﬁcation provided that veriﬁcation costs are suﬃciently high.
7Alternatively, the existence problem could be avoided by explicitely modeling competitive contract markets in
which banks and entrepreneurs interact: such a setting always has an equilibrium (Gale [8], Geanakoplos and Dubey
[7]), which in particular may entail pooling (Gale [8], Martin [10]).
8The intuition is that, by adding a third stage in which applications may be rejected, banks are eﬀectively able
to anticipate the eﬀects of their deviations. Hence, banks understand that, if they were to destroy the pooling
equilibrium, pooling contracts would no longer be proﬁtable and applications to these contracts would be rejected in
equilibrium: but this, in turn, means that a deviating bank would ultimately attract bad as well as good borrowers.
For a discussion of Hellwig’s characterization, see Riley [13].
6whole weight of screening is borne by the size of loans, and the investment undertaken by good
entrepreneurs is constrained with respect to the full-information benchmark. This constraint is
relaxed as the relative wealth of entrepreneurs increases, making it possible to screen more through
collateral and less through loan size. I then characterize pooling equilibria and show that collateral
also plays an important role in determining them.
3.1 Separating Equilibria
Under the assumptions of exclusivity and no cross-subsidization, a separating equilibrium is deﬁned
as follows,
Deﬁnition 1. For a given interest rate-entrepreneurial wealth pair (r,W), a separating equilibrium
is a set of contracts CSEP(r,W) = {(IB,RB,cB),(IG,RG,cG)} satisfying the following conditions:
1. Feasibility: contracts must respect the collateralization constraint,
cj ∈ [0,
W
Ij ] for j ∈ {B,G}. (3)
2. Incentive Compatibility: each entrepreneur applies to the contract designed for his type,
πj(Ij,Rj,cj) ≥ πj(Ii,Ri,ci) for i  = j, i,j ∈ {B,G}. (4)
3. Zero-proﬁt condition for banks: each contract must yield banks zero proﬁts in expectation,
1 + r = pjRj + (1 − pj)(1 + r)cj for j ∈ {B,G}. (5)
4. No bank can proﬁt by oﬀering alternative contracts.
Equations (3)-(5) are standard: note simply that Eq. (5) stems from bank competition together
with the no cross-subsidization condition. Clearly, since banks compete to attract good entrepre-
neurs, a separating equilibrium requires that the proﬁts of these entrepreneurs are maximized
subject to Eqs. (3)-(5). The resulting contracts are characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Given (r,W), the separating equilibrium is characterized by a pair of contracts











pGIG (1 + r)] −
 




pG)IG (1 + r)
≤ 1. (8)
Proof. See Section 6.1.1 in the Appendix.
Equation (6) implies that equilibrium contracts taken by bad entrepreneurs entail no distortions.
Thus, they are lent the eﬃcient amount at the given interest rate and they have no need to
provide collateral. It is therefore on the contracts taken by good entrepreneurs that the interest
of the equilibrium lies, since they must be incentive compatible. What are the properties of these
contracts?
If collateral is scarce and the incentive compatibility constraint binds, Eq. (7) implies that
good entrepreneurs will be rationed with respect to the full-information allocation. Hence, they
will receive smaller loans than they would desire at the prevailing interest rate. The use of loan
sizes to screen entrepreneurs is costly, though, whereas the use of collateral —to the extent that it is
available— is not. This is because diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs diﬀer in their willingness to accept
a higher interest factor in exchange for a lower collateral requirement. As long as the constraint in
Eq. 3 is slack, banks can always decrease RG and increase cG while keeping the expected proﬁt of
the contract unchanged for good entrepreneurs: such a modiﬁcation, though, increases the cost of
the contract for bad entrepreneurs because they stand to lose their collateral more often.9
As I mentioned earlier, then, the design of the separating contracts reduces to a problem of
multidimensional screening, in which the loan size and the rate of collateralization are used in
order to induce separation between diﬀerent technologies. In order to provide a simple graphical
interpretation of Proposition 1, I deﬁne a “no mimicry constraint” (NMC) as the set of G-type
contracts that satisfy Eqs. (4) and (5). Figure 1 depicts the NMC in the (IG,cG) space, which is
non-monotonic and is maximized when IG = IB∗
.
9In fact, it can be easily veriﬁed that —for any level of r— the marginal rate of substitution between the interest
factor R and the collateral requirement c is equal to −
￿
(1 + r)(1 − p
j)/p
j￿









For low levels of cG, it must be the case that IG  = IB∗
: this is so because when collateral is
relatively scarce, screening must be done through investment. In such a scenario, the only way
to discourage bad entrepreneurs from applying to the G-type contracts is by restricting or by
expanding the amount of investment that they must undertake relative to their eﬃcient level. For
higher rates of collateralization, though, there is less of a need to screen through investment and
the incentive-compatible levels of IG therefore draw closer to IB∗
. When both loan sizes are equal,
investment is no longer used for screening and the full weight of the separation must fall on the
rate of collateralization. Hence, the latter is maximized at this point, at which it reaches one.
Of course, not all of the contracts on the NMC can be implemented at equilibrium: in order
for this to be possible, contracts must also satisfy the collateralization constraint. Graphically,
this means that the equilibrium G-type contract must lie at an intersection of the NMC and the
collateralization constraint. Although there is a pair of such contracts for any given level of wealth
W, competition among banks will select the one that maximizes the proﬁts of good entrepreneurs
as an equilibrium outcome. Under my assumptions, this is the contract entailing a lower loan size
and a higher rate of collateralization, as depicted by point S in Figure 1.10
This result, by which good entrepreneurs are screened in equilibrium by restricting their loan
size, closely resembles the traditional Rothschild-Stiglitz result. Nonetheless, I believe that it
is particularly surprising in the context of my production economy. In the complete absence of
10Intuitively, both contracts entail the same total level of collateral. Hence, bad entrepreneurs can only be indiﬀerent
between the two if the diﬀerence in output implied by them equals the diﬀerence in repayments in the event of success.
However, if this is the case, good entrepreneurs prefer the one with the lower loan size: this stems from the fact that
their marginal rate of substitution between I and R is lower than that of bad entrepreneurs.
9collateral, it implies that the safer, more productive technology will be constrained not only with
respect to the eﬃcient allocation, but even with respect to its riskier, less productive counterpart.
3.2 Pooling Equilibria
As was mentioned earlier, Hellwig’s three-stage characterization of competition in the credit market
allows for the existence of a pooling equilibrium when the latter Pareto dominates the separating
allocation. A pooling equilibrium is deﬁned as follows,
Deﬁnition 2. For a given interest rate-entrepreneurial wealth pair (r,W), a pooling equilibrium is
a contract CPOOL(r,W) = {(¯ I, ¯ R,¯ c)} satisfying the following conditions:
1. Feasibility: the pooling contract must respect the collateralization constraint.
2. Zero-proﬁt condition for banks: when oﬀered to a pool of applicants representative of the
population, the contract must yield banks zero proﬁts in expectation.
3. No bank can proﬁt by oﬀering alternative contracts.
In traditional models of signaling, the existence of a pooling equilibrium entails cross-subsidies
from good types to bad types: this is also true in my framework, although the extent of such
transfers ultimately depends on the wealth of entrepreneurs and on the way in which payments are
divided between the interest factor ( ¯ R) and the rate of collateralization (¯ c). As the following propo-
sition shows, any pooling equilibrium will entail a binding collateralization constraint, although the
amount of investment will be independent of entrepreneurial wealth.





(1 + r), (9)
¯ R = (1 + r)[







where ¯ p = λGpG + λBpB denotes the average probability of success of all projects in the economy.
Proof. See Section 6.1.2 in the Appendix.
Equation (11) implies that a pooling equilibrium must entail a binding collateralization con-
straint and, consequently, that the degree of cross-subsidization it exhibits depends on entrepreneur-
ial wealth. Higher rates of collateralization decrease the average cost of funds for good entrepreneurs
10and hence increase their proﬁts. Since the equilibrium pooling contract will be the one that maxi-
mizes the proﬁts of these entrepreneurs while yielding zero proﬁts to banks, Eq. (11) must hold at
equilibrium.
The same reasoning applies for the level of investment in a pooling equilibrium as deﬁned
implicitly in Eq. (9). When W = 0, the condition must clearly be satisﬁed since it simply equates
the marginal productivity of investment of good entrepreneurs to their marginal cost of funds.
As entrepreneurial wealth increases, however, so does the rate of collateralization of the pooling
contract: in doing so, the average cost of funds decreases and proﬁts increase for good entrepreneurs.
The size of the loan, however, remains ﬁxed, since the cost of the marginal unit borrowed by these




(1 + r) and therefore Eq. (9) must hold.
A ﬁnal consideration will prove useful in order to better understand the pooling equilibrium:
both the pooling loan size (¯ I) and the size of loans given to bad entrepreneurs in the separating
equilibrium (IB∗
) are independent of entrepreneurial wealth. In fact, their relative magnitude
depends only on the value of ¯ p, and simple arithmetic yields the following remark.
Remark 1. For any interest rate r, it is the case that
¯ I(r, ¯ p) ⋚ IB∗
(r) ⇔ ¯ p ⋚
αBpB
αG , (12)
where ¯ I, IB∗
and ¯ p are deﬁned as above.
Thus, if the ratio of good to bad entrepreneurs in the economy is high enough to make ¯ p surpass
the threshold in Eq. (12), the pooling allocation will entail overinvestment of bad entrepreneurs
relative to the separating equilibrium.
4 Regime Switches and Investment
Let CEQ(r,W) denote the equilibrium contracts for an economy indexed by (r,W): will these
contracts be pooling or separating? As discussed before, the answer to this question depends on
the proﬁts that each type of contract yields good entrepreneurs.11 And this, in turn, depends on
the level of entrepreneurial wealth. Consider, for example, the case of pooling contracts. If they are
ever to arise in equilibrium, they will do so when separating contracts yield relatively low proﬁts:
this occurs when entrepreneurial wealth and —consequently— collateral are low. It therefore seems
natural to suppose that there is a critical level of entrepreneurial wealth or “switching point” that
11I show in the Appendix (Section 6.1.2) that, whenever good entrepreneurs prefer the optimal pooling to the
optimal separating contract, bad entrepreneurs do so as well.
11determines —for a given interest rate— a change in regime from pooling to separating or vice-versa:
let W∗(r) denote such switching points.
I proceed as follows: ﬁrst, I restrict parameter values for which all economies indexed by (r,0)
display a pooling equilibrium, i.e., for which the latter arises in the absence of collateralizable
wealth. I then prove that these same restrictions guarantee that the mapping W∗(r) is a function,
so that there is a unique switching point for each value of the interest rate.
Lemma 1. If ¯ p ≥
αBpB
αG then CEQ(r,0) = CPOOL(r,0) for all values of r.
Proof. See Section 6.2 in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 determines a threshold value of ¯ p above which the equilibrium is always pooling when
W = 0. From Eq. (12), this threshold makes it possible to relate loan sizes in the pooling and
separating equilibria: in particular, when the pooling loan size is weakly larger than the B-type
loan size in the separating contracts, an economy with no collateral will pool all loans regardless of
the interest rate. The threshold value of ¯ p contained in Lemma 1 also guarantees the existence of
a unique switching point for each level of r, as the following Lemma states:
Lemma 2. If ¯ p ≥
αBpB
αG , the mapping W∗(r) is a function, i.e., there is a unique switching point
for each value of the interest rate.
Proof. See Section 6.2 in the Appendix.
Therefore, whenever ¯ p ≥
 
αBpB/αG 
, there exists a unique switching point W∗(r) for each value
of r: if W < W∗(r), the equilibrium of the economy is pooling, whereas it is separating otherwise.
I am ultimately interested in explaining the composition and level of aggregate investment, though.
Hence, I now turn my attention to the impact of regime switches on investment. As I show, there
are two distinct cases depending on the value of ¯ p.
When ¯ p =
 
αBpB/αG 
, Eq. (12) implies that ¯ I(r) = IB∗
(r). Additionally, I show in Section
6.3 of the Appendix that in this case
W∗(r) = IB∗
(r),
so that the switching point also equals the size of B-type loans. This implies that, in this limiting
case, there is no cross-subsiziation at the switching point since the pooling loan is fully collateralized.
But it must immediately follow that
IG(r,W∗(r)) = W∗(r) = IB∗
(r). (13)
12The intuition behind Eq. (13) is simple: since the pooling loan is fully collateralized at the switching
point, the only way in which good entrepreneurs can be indiﬀerent between this contract and
the separating contract is if both of them entail the same loan sizes, i.e. if IG(r,W∗(r)) = ¯ I(r).
Consequently, when ¯ p =
 
αBpB/αG 
, aggregate investment is smooth when the equilibrium switches
from pooling to separating. For W < W∗(r), the economy displays a pooling equilibrium. At W∗(r),
there is a switch in regime and a separating equilibrium emerges: aggregate investment, however,
remains constant under the new regime, since the change to separating contracts does not aﬀect
loan sizes.
When ¯ p >
 
αBpB/αG 
, however, there is a discontinuity in aggregate investment when the
regime switches from pooling to separating. In this case, ¯ I(r) > IB∗
(r), so that the switch from
pooling to separating must entail a contraction in the amount invested by bad entrepreneurs. The
same will be true of their good counterparts, for whom it must be the case that
IG(r,W∗(r)) < ¯ I(r). (14)
What is the intuition behind Eq. (14)? At the switching point, good entrepreneurs are by deﬁnition
indiﬀerent between both kinds of contracts. The pooling contract, however, entails some degree
of cross-subsidization, whereas the separating one does not. Thus, the only way in which good
entrepreneurs can be indiﬀerent between both contracts is if the separating contract entails a lower
loan size. Therefore, when the economy switches from a pooling to a separating equilibrium under
the assumption that ¯ p >
αBpB
αG , there is a contraction in the amount invested by all entrepreneurs.
Lemma 3 summarizes this discussion.
Lemma 3. 1. If ¯ p =
αBpB
αG , then
¯ I(r) = IG(r,W∗(r)) = W∗(r) = IB(r).
2. If ¯ p >
αBpB
αG , then
¯ I(r) > IG(r,W∗(r)) > W∗(r) > IB(r).
Proof. See Section 6.3 in the Appendix.
5 Concluding Remarks
The main results of this paper have been derived in a stylized model, thereby making it natural to
inquire on their robustness to alternative settings. Here I comment on some natural directions in
13which the assumptions of the model could be relaxed and on their eﬀects on my basic results:
1. In the present version of the model, debt contracts arise as the optimal arrangement due to
the binary distribution of investment project outcomes. In a more general setting in which
project returns were characterized by a distribution over a continuum of outcomes, Boyd
and Smith (1993) have shown that debt contracts can still arise as the optimal contractual
arrangements in the presence of suﬃciently high veriﬁcation costs.
2. I have assumed throughout that there is no cost of providing collateral, so that the latter has
the same value for borrowers and investors. None of my results would change if I introduced
a wedge between borrowers’ and investors’ valuation of collateral, as the latter would still be
useful —albeit not costless— as a screening device between good and bad investors.
3. I have assumed that entrepreneurs are risk neutral. Risk aversion in the preferences of en-
trepreneurs would generate an additional cost of pledging their wealth as collateral, since
doing so would increases the variance of consumption. Hence, this eﬀect could restrain the
amount of collateral pledged and of investment undertaken in the economy under the sepa-
rating regime. On the other hand, and precisely because of this reason, collateral could be
more eﬀective as a screening device. The net impact on the level of collateralization and
investment would depend on the relative importance of these two eﬀects.
4. I have characterized the contracts under the assumption of a ﬁxed interest rate. It could
be thought that, since investment may be discontinuous, the existence of an equilibrium
is not guaranteed in a general equilibrium setting in which the interest rate is determined
endogenously. It can be shown, though, that any problems of this type can be dealt with
through the introduction of random contracts.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Characterization of Contracts
As explained in the main body of the paper, I follow Hellwig [9] and model competition as a three-
stage game in which banks design contracts, ﬁrms apply to at most one of them and banks accept
or reject applications. Hellwig shows that such a game always has a sequential Nash equilibrium.
15In particular, pooling contracts are Nash equilibria whenever they Pareto dominate the separating
pairs. It can be shown that Nash-equilibrium contracts arise from maximizing a welfare function
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints under the assumptions of exclusivity and no
cross-subsidization.
Throughout the Appendix, I derive the family of equilibrium contracts for a given net interest
rate-entrepreneurial wealth pair (r,W). I seek for an optimum within the set of contracts that
satisfy exclusivity and no cross-subsidization. These contracts are obtained by maximizing the
borrowers’ proﬁts subject to the lenders’ participation constraints. Although there are diﬀerent
possible interpretations of the planner’s objective function, I make it equal to the proﬁts of good
entrepreneurs.
In the case of optimal separating contracts, these proﬁts are maximized subject to the incentive
compatibility constraints, the no cross-subsidization condition (i.e., banks’ zero-proﬁt conditions)
and the collateralization constraints. In the case of the optimal pooling contract, the optimiza-
tion problem is analogous with the diﬀerence that it is not subject to an incentive compatibility
constraint. Throughout the Appendix, then, I use the terms “optimal separating” and “optimal
pooling” contracts to denote the respective solutions of these optimization problems.
6.1.1 Separating Contracts








Ij ] for j ∈ {G,B}.
I solve this problem using only one of the incentive compatibility constraints: I will later show that
the other one is slack at the optimal solution. It is straightforward to see that any optimal solution
will entail pBαBf′(IB) = (1 + r). The problem can then be reinterpreted as seeking to maximize
the proﬁts of good entrepreneurs subject to a “no mimicry” (henceforth, NMC) constraint by which,
pBαBf(IG) − (
pB
pG + [1 −
pB
pG]cG)(1 + r)IG = pBαBf(IB∗
) − IB∗
(1 + r) = K.
16The previous condition speciﬁes cG in terms of IG, a mapping specifying all combinations of both
variables that satisfy the zero-proﬁt condition and the incentive compatibility constraint. This









Along the NMC, cG is maximized exactly when IG = IB∗
, at which point it equals one. Moreover,
simple derivation shows this mapping to be strictly concave, so that cG is monotonically increasing
in IG whenever IG < IB∗
and monotonically decreasing otherwise. The full-information investment
of good entrepreneurs IG∗
therefore lies on the downward sloping section of the NMC.
When wealth constraints are binding, I need to take into account an additional constraint given
by cGIG ≤ W. This constraint determines a hyperbola in the
 
cG,IG 
space so that —when the
constraint is binding— the optimal G-type contract must lie on the intersection of this hyperbola
with the NMC, as depicted in Figure 1 in the main body of the paper. It can be shown that, of
the two potential G-type contracts that satisfy both the wealth constraint and the NMC, the one
with lower loan size and higher rate of collateralization is the optimal one.
Finally, I have solved the problem under the assumption that the incentive compatibility con-
straint for good entrepreneurs holds, so that
pGαGf(IG) − (1 + r)IG > pGαGf(IB∗












(1 + r)IG = pBαBf(IB∗
) − (1 + r)IB∗
.
Multiplying the ﬁrst expression by
pBαB











The inequality in Eq. (16) is always satisﬁed for W = 0. Additionally, the derivative of the RHS of
with respect to W is strictly positive as long as IG is constrained below its optimal level. Hence,
Eq. (16) holds for all levels of W.
176.1.2 Pooling Contracts






(1 + r)I − (1 −
pG
¯ p
)(1 + r)cI + W(1 + r),
st.




ϕ : c ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem are,
I : pGαGf′(I) −
pG
¯ p
(1 + r) − (1 −
pG
¯ p
)(1 + r)c − ν(
W
(I)
2) = 0, (17)
c : −(1 −
pG
¯ p
)(1 + r)I − ν + ϕ = 0. (18)
From Eq. (18), the collateralization constraint must bind, so that c = W






which proves the result.
6.2 Characterization of Regime Switches
Lemma 1. The proof is by contradiction. If ¯ p =
αBpB
αG , the proﬁts obtained by good entrepreneurs
at the contract CPOOL(r,0) are given by
αGpGf(¯ I) −
αGpG
αBpB (1 + r) ¯ I,
where, from Eq. (12), ¯ I = IB∗
. Suppose that good entrepreneurs prefer the separating contract
CSEP(r,0) to the pooling, so that
αGpGf(IG) − (1 + r)IG > αGpGf(¯ I) −
αGpG
αBpB (1 + r) ¯ I.
The previous inequality implies that
αBpBf(IG) −
αBpB
αGpG (1 + r)IG > αBpBf(¯ I) − (1 + r) ¯ I,
18which is impossible since it violates the incentive compatibility constraint that bad entrepreneurs
must satisfy under contracts CSEP(r,0). Suppose instead the extreme case in which ¯ p ≈ pG.
Then, trivially, good entrepreneurs obtain higher proﬁts from the pooling than from the separating
contract. As for bad entrepreneurs, their proﬁts would be given by
αBpBf(¯ I) −
pB
pG (1 + r) ¯ I,
which must be higher than what they obtain under the separating contracts. This is true since
IG > IB∗
and, for ¯ I ≈ IG,
αBpBf′(¯ I) >
pB
pG (1 + r).
Lemma 2. The proof compares the proﬁts of good entrepreneurs under pooling and separating
contracts for a given value of r. From the previous Lemma, the restriction on ¯ p implies that
πG(CPOOL(r,0)) > πG(CSEP(r,0)),
for all values of r. Additionally, it is easy to verify that whenever W = ¯ I(r), the following also
holds:
πG(CPOOL(r, ¯ I(r))) ≤ πG(CSEP(r, ¯ I(r))),
since the proﬁts that the pooling contract yields to good entrepreneurs are bounded from above
by αGpGf(¯ I), which are attained under full collateralization. The proﬁts of good entrepreneurs
under the separating contracts, on the other hand, are bounded from below by αGpGf(W), since
the rate of collateralization is weakly smaller than one. Thus, the economy will display a pooling
equilibrium when W = 0 regardless of the interest rate, but it will display a separating equilibrium






(1 + r), (19)
which is linear and increasing in W. On the other hand, πG(CSEP(r,W)) is concave and increasing
in W. Hence, both proﬁts loci can only intersect once for a given value of r, thus proving that
W∗(r) is a function.
196.3 Investment at the Switching Point (Lemma 3)
Recall that the switching point is deﬁned as a level of wealth satisfying the following equality:
αGpGf(IG(r,W∗(r))) − (1 + r)IG(r,W∗(r)) = (20)











I start by analyzing the case in which ¯ p =
 
αBpB/αG 





pGαG (1 + r)[IG(r,W∗(r)) − W∗(r)] (21)
= αBpBf(IB∗
(r)) − (1 + r)[IB∗
(r) − W∗(r)],
which, together with the incentive compatibility constraint, implies that IG(r,W∗(r)) = W∗(r). It
follows that
¯ I(r) = IG(r,W∗(r)) = W∗(r) = IB∗
(r).
If, on the other hand, ¯ p >
 
αBpB/αG 
, it has been shown that ¯ I(r) > IB∗
(r). From the incentive
compatibility constraint, it then follows that
αBpBf(IG(r,W∗(r))) −
pB
pG (1 + r)[IG(r,W∗(r)) − W∗(r)] (22)
> αBpBf(¯ I(r)) − (1 + r)[¯ I(r) − W∗(r)],
which, together with Eq. (20) implies:
¯ I(r) > IG(r,W∗(r)) > W∗(r).
Combined with the incentive compatibility constraint, the previous inequalities also imply that
W∗(r) > IB∗
(r), which proves the result.
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